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INTRODUCTION

Since the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in Chevron
US.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' legal academics,

practicing attorneys, and federal court judges have puzzled over the precise
rationale undergirding the requirement that reviewing courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.2 Justice Stevens'

* Ethan Allen Faculty Fellow and Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee
University School of Law.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989) (critiquing Chevron and arguing
that judicial deference to administrative agencies undermines the separation of powers in
favor of the executive branch); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992) (noting that
reviewing courts cite Chevron with extraordinary frequency and suggesting the decision
leads reviewing courts to abjure their supervisory duties over federal agencies); Ronald M.
Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,72 Cin.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1259
(1997) ("[Tjhe principal question about judicial deference to administrative constructions
has become, not whether the courts can live with Chevron, but how they can domesticate it
for everyday use."); Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationof
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (discussing the standard of deference promulgated in Chevron);
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opinion offers several reasons for the Chevron rule, any one of which might

be thought sufficient to justify federal courts applying a margin of appreciation to the work product of a federal administrative agency. The princi-

pal justification rested on a theory of implied delegation of lawmaking
power; courts should presume that Congress intends agencies to write
regulations that have the force of law.
Consistent with this argument, a reviewing court lacks legitimacy if it
attempts to displace an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous

statute with its own interpretation of the statute. After all, Congress vested
the agency, not the federal judiciary, with the authority to resolve the
meaning of ambiguous statutory text.
The idea of judicial deference to agency interpretations of vague statu-

tory text was, however, hardly a new invention. For decades prior to Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court directed lower federal courts to review agency
work product with some measure of deference. Indeed, Chenery, one of
administrative law's golden oldies, squarely held that federal judges should
afford persuasive force to the work product of agencies based on the assumption that agencies possessed greater expertise over their own statutes
and polices than did federal courts.3
These rationales for deference will, inevitably, lead to conflicting results
in some circumstances. Absent an express or implied delegation of lawmaking power, a federal court could deny an agency's work product deference. This would remain so even if the agency possesses greater familiarPeter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An EmpiricalStudy of Federal AdministrativeLaw, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984, 1058-59 (arguing that Chevron buttressed the
deference principle in four important ways); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 73
Tnx. L. Rrv. 83, 84-87 (1994) (noting the disagreement among Chevron commentators on
the propriety and scope of the Chevron doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 2071, 2106 (1990) (maintaining that statutory ambiguities should be sorted out on basis of assessment of which interpretation is reasonable);
Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tillerand Cross, 99 CoLuM. L. REv. 235, 240-47 (1999)
(discussing the tendency to utilize the Chevron framework without actually citing the case);
Patricia M. Wald, JudicialReview in Midpassage: The Uneasy PartnershipBetween Courts
and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221,243 (1996) (citing cases demonstrating the high
frequency with which D.C. Circuit judges disagree about whether Congress has expressed
clear intent, or whether there is an ambiguity for the agency to resolve and noting that this
suggests reviewing courts may manipulate the Chevron decision to reach desired results);
Russell L. Weaver, Chevron: Martin, Anthony, and Format Requirements, 40 U. KAN. L.
Rav. 587 (1992) (noting the importance of Chevron doctrine and contending that Chevron
deference should be applied to interpretive rules).
3. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,209 (1947) (explaining that agency decisions reflecting "the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities
of the problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the
uncontested facts" are "entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts.").
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ity and expertise with the subject matter, and even if the agency used procedures that generally will ensure that its work product reflects the benefit
of the agency's expertise (i.e., notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication). Such a result would be consistent with the implied delegation rationale of Chevron, but not with the expertise
rationale set forth in
4
cases like Chenery and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has not merely reaffirmed, but
substantially broadened, the implied delegation rationale for according
agency work product deference. In Christensenv. HarrisCounty,5 the Justices held that informal agency guidelines did not merit Chevron deference
because such materials, in the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), were not enacted under an implied delegation of lawmaking power
to the Department of Labor.6 In the following term, the Court reaffirmed
the Christensen principle in United States v. Mead Corp. 7holding that unless Congress delegates formal lawmaking power to an agency, the
agency's work product, in whatever form, does not merit Chevron defer8
ence.
This Article will explore the tension between the implied delegation theory set forth in Chevron and competing expertise-based rationales for judicial deference to agency work product. In my view, the expertise rationale
provides a stronger justification for giving deference to agency work product than does the implied delegation theory. If one finds this argument persuasive, the Supreme Court asked the wrong question in Christensen and
Mead. Whether Chevron deference applies in a given case should not turn
on the legal fiction of an implied delegation of lawmaking power, but
rather on whether the materials at issue reflect and incorporate agency ex9
pertise.
4. See John F.Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference to Agency
InterpretationsofAgency Rules, 96 CoLuN. L. REv. 612, 680-81, 686-90 (1996) (arguing

federal courts reviewing administrative agency action should take into account agency's expertise
benefit
5.
6.

and experience, and provide more deferential review of agency action reflecting
of considered application of expertise).
529 U.S. 576 (2000).
See id. at 586-88.

7. 533 U.S.218 (2001).
8. See id. at 226-27 ("We hold that administrative implementation of a particular
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.").
9. But cf.Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and
Courts?, 7 YALE J. oN REG. 1,43-44 (1990) ("[P]he key inquiry ineach case should be the

delegation inquiry: whether Congress intended an interpretation in this format to have the
force of law."); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89

GEo. L.J.
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If an administrative agency resolves a statutory ambiguity, whether
through an adjudication, a rulemaking, or a policy statement, the relevant
question to be asked and answered is whether the agency possesses relevant
expertise over the subject matter and whether, on the record, the agency
actually brought that expertise to bear in creating the work product in
question. Agency interpretations developed in formal adjudications and
notice-and-comment rulemakings involve procedures that force agencies to
think carefully about the matter at hand.
Such proceedings also provide potentially affected parties more than
ample opportunities to question and test the agency's assumptions. 10 Work
product resulting from such proceedings will almost invariably reflect the
benefit of expertise, and therefore should merit deference.
Conversely, when agencies issue informal guidelines, policy statements,
or interpretive rules, federal courts should reflexively withhold Chevron
deference absent a persuasive showing that the work product in fact incorporates and reflects the benefit of agency expertise. To be sure, federal
courts may not order agencies to use particular procedures to enact new
policies implementing statutes within their jurisdiction." Nor may the federal courts impose procedural requirements not set forth in either the2
agency's organic statute or the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1
Nevertheless, neither Bell Aerospace nor Vermont Yankee precludes the
federal courts from giving agencies an incentive to provide process in exchange for deference on review. Absent such an explicit trade, there is
good reason to fear that agencies may attempt to claim Chevron deference
for policies that are ill-considered, if not irrational. Poorly conceived
regulations often do more harm than no regulations at all. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court should reorient the Christensen/Meadrule to reward dili-

833, 870-73 (2001) (arguing that the scope of Chevron deference should depend on whether

agency can advance persuasive argument in favor of finding that Congress delegated lawmaking authority whether expressly or by implication).
10. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1396-98, 1436-43 (1992) (arguing notice-and-comment rulemaking
proceedings under section 553 of the APA already afford regulated entities many opportunities to delay rulemaking process, causing additional delay and expense for federal admin-

istrative agencies).
11. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974) (holding administrative agency may modify policy developed through adjudication in subsequent adjudica-

tion rather than through rulemaking proceeding because agencies generally enjoy freedom
to make policy through rulemakings or adjudications).
12. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 541-49 (1978) (holding federal courts may not impose procedural requirements

beyond those set by Congress, but may review substance of agency action pursuant to section 706 of the APA).
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13
gent agencies and punish agencies that attempt, like the Queen of Hearts,
to reach ultimate conclusions without process adequate to ensure the reliability of the result.

I.

A BRIEF REVIEW OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCY
WORK PRODUCT

The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Christensenand Mead resolved
a lingering tension in the case law regarding the precise source of judicial
deference to the work product of administrative agencies. In a line of cases
pre-dating the APA, the Court established a rule of deference on the theory
that agencies possess superior expertise over the matters within their jurisdiction. When an agency decision appears to be the product of this specialized expertise, reviewing courts must afford some measure of deference
to the agency's decision.
In 1984, the Supreme Court restated the general rule that agencies, and
not courts, enjoy principal responsibility for interpreting ambiguous statutes. The Chevron decision, however, relied upon a novel theory of implied delegation, rather than agency expertise, as the foundation of this rule
of deference.' 4 Chevron did reference agency expertise as a background
consideration supporting a rule of deference;' 5 nevertheless, an implied
delegation of lawmaking power, rather than agency expertise, compelled
the result.' 6 As will be explained more fully below, these rationales, at
least in some circumstances, will lead to conflicting results.
A.

The ExpertiseRationale

The Supreme Court established a sliding scale of deference for the work
product of administrative agencies in Skidmore,17 In considering the application of the FLSA to a group of company firemen, the Court affirmed the
Department of Labor's interpretation of the Act, which was favorable to the
claims of the firemen. Justice Jackson explained that "the Administrator's
policies are made in pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to

13. See LEwis CARROLL, ALiCE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE
LooKiNG-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 245-61 (Charles E. Tuttle Co. Pub, 1968)
(reporting on cognitive dissonance Alice experienced in response to arbitrary procedures
associated with decision making in Court of Hearts).
14. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45.
15. See id. at 843-44.
16. See id. at 844.
17. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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come to a judge in a particular case.'" Accordingly, the Administrator's
formal interpretations of the FLSA "while not controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance."19
In any particular case, the weight that a reviewing court should afford an
agency's interpretation of a federal statute should depend upon "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 20 This reasoning
uses agency expertise-not an implied delegation to promulgate quasistatutory rules-as the basis for federal courts affording agency work product deference.
Three years later, the Justices reaffirmed expertise, rather than an implied delegation, as the source of judicial deference to agency work product. In SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery B),21 the Supreme Court held that
in the absence of an express congressional command to proceed through
rulemaking or adjudication, reviewing courts should give deference to an
agency's decision to establish new policies through adjudication rather than
rulemaking. "(Tihe choice made between proceeding by general rule or by
individual, ad hoc litigation is one that
lies primarily in the informed dis' 22
cretion of the administrative agency. ,
Justice Murphy justified this result as follows:
The Commission's conclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is

the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the
problem, realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the

uncontested facts. It is the type of judgment which administrative agencies are best
equipped to make and which justifies the use of the administrative process. Whether
we agree or disagree with the result reached, it is an allowable judgment which we
cannot disturb.2

Although Chenery 11 focused upon a procedural choice rather than a
substantive interpretation of an ambiguous statute, the Supreme Court's rationale for providing deference to an agency's choice of procedural vehicle
for policy making-expertise-should be equally applicable to an agency's
attempt to resolve statutory ambiguities. If a particular agency decision
18. Id. at 139.
19. Id. at 140.

20. Id.
21. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

22. Id. at 203.
23. Id. at 209 (citations omitted).
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plainly reflects the benefit of "administrative experience," a reviewing
court should afford the decision some measure of deference.
Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, argued in dissent that the
invocation of "administrative experience" should not insulate an agency's
decision from probing judicial review. He argued that "administrative experience is of weight in judicial review only to this point-it is a persuasive
reason for deference to the Commission in the exercise of its discretionary
powers under and within the law."2 4
Later in FTC v. Cement Institute,25 the Supreme Court sustained the marriage of executive, legislative, and judicial functions in a single administrative body. Writing for the majority, Justice Black explained that agencies
undertake duties associated with all three federal branches precisely because Congress seeks to create an entity with specialized knowledge and
experience in interpreting and enforcing a federal regulatory regime. 'Ve
are persuaded that the Commission's long and close examination of the
questions it here decided has provided it with precisely the experience that
fits it for performance of its statutory duty."' 26 Marriage of functions permits agencies to develop and maintain expertise, expertise that will be
brought to bear when the agency goes about its business.27
In Justice Black's view, prior experience with a problem enhances an
agency's ability to respond to the problem effectively. Permitting agencies
to perform both investigative and prosecutorial functions would improve,
rather than debase, the agency's work product. If courts embraced a strict
separation of functions, "experience acquired from their work as commisinstead of an advantage. Such was not the insioners would be a handicap
28
tendment of Congress.
Skidmore, Chenery, and Cement Institute all invoke enhanced agency
expertise as the rationale for affording agency work product deference on
judicial review. None of these cases rests the deference principle on an
implied delegation of authority to make binding interpretations of ambiguous statutory text. One should also note that two of these three cases
(Chenery and Cement Institute) post-date the enactment of the APA. Thus,
at least arguably, the expertise rationale for affording agency work product
deference survived the enactment of the APA. 29

24. Id. at 215 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
25. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
26. Id. at 720.
27. See id. ("The kind of specialized knowledge Congress wanted its agency to have
was an expertness that would fit it to stop at the threshold every unfair trade practice ..
28. Id. at 702.
29. Cf Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589-91 (2000) (Scalia, J., concur-

ring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that any "authoritative" agency inter-
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B. Chevron: Expertise andDelegationDistinguished
Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,30 restated the Skidmore rule of deference, but relocated the basis for judicial
deference from expertise to an implied delegation of lawmaking power.
Justice Stevens explained that "[if Congress has explicitly left a gap for
the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency
to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation., 31 Of course,
"[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. 32 In either case, Justice Stevens admonished that "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
33
an agency.
As a justification of this rule, Justice Stevens quoted from a Skidmoreera precedent holding that when "'a full understanding of the force of the
statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations"' a
reviewing court should not disturb the agency's decision "'unless it appears
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one
that Congress would have sanctioned."'34 In consequence, when a statute
contains ambiguous language, a reviewing court should defer to an administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of the language, rather than displace the agency's interpretation with an interpretation of its own choosing.
A careful reader should note that Justice Stevens substituted an implied
delegation for the Skidmore presumption that agency work product reflecting the application of specialized agency expertise merits deference. Under
the Skidmore principle, a reasonable construction of a statute that does not
reflect the benefit of agency expertise would not receive reflexive deference; the "power to persuade" depends on the agency's ability to demonstrate that it actually brought to bear its superior understanding of the
problem. By way of contrast, Chevron deference is not contingent on proof
that an agency decision actually reflects and incorporates expertise.
Strictly speaking, an agency could roll dice to pick from among reasonable

pretation of an ambiguous statute, whether or not arived at via a notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, should receive Chevron deference). In Christensen,Justice
Scalia explains that although "Chevron in fact involved an interpretative regulation, the rationale of the case was not limited to that context ... " Id.at 589-90.
30. 467 U.S. 837(1984).
31. Id. at 843-44.
32. Id. at 844.

33. Id. (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 844-45 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374,382,383 (1961)).
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interpretations of ambiguous statutory text and the dice roll choice should
be entitled to receive Chevron deference.
Obviously, an agency decision that, by sheer luck, happens to be a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute should not receive reflexive
deference from a reviewing court. Yet, Chevron seems to command just
such a result. A reviewing court must afford a reasonable, but illconsidered, agency decision just as much deference as a well-considered
agency decision that happens to be reasonable.
Justice Stevens does reference, albeit implicitly, the importance of
agency expertise in defending the Chevron rule of deference:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of
the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests,
but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency
to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits
of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise
policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch
of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests
which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the35agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.

He concluded by noting that:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether
it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.
In such a case, federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the
wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views
of the public interest are not judicial ones ....

Although Justice Stevens presupposes that agency expertise will be
brought to bear when a federal agency interprets an ambiguous statutory
text, it is the implied delegation-and not the agency's expertise-that
commands deference.
C. Christensen and Mead: Deference andExpertise Divorced
In Christensen v. Harris County,37 the Supreme Court had to decide
whether Chevron deference applied to informal agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes. Christensen involved the proper construction of a
FLSA provision regarding the use of compensatory time for overtime hours
35. Id. at 865-66.
36. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.

37. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
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worked. Section 207 of the FLSA permits certain public employers to give
employees compensatory time in lieu of cash compensation3 s The statute
limits the amount of compensatory time that a public employee may accrue; if a public employee reaches the maximum amount of bankable compensatory time, the public employer must begin compensating the employee for overtime work with cash.
Naturally enough, public employers would prefer to avoid incurring unbudgeted salary expenses for employees working overtime hours. The
sheriffs department in Harris County, Texas, decided to resolve the problem by requiring employees approaching the statutory limits on accrued
compensatory time to use the time before exceeding the limits. If an employee refused to use the time voluntarily, the sheriff's department would
simply require the employee to take paid leave.3 9
In an opinion letter, the Department of Labor held that a public employer
could schedule forced compensatory time off only incident to a prior negotiated agreement between the employer and the employees. 40 In the absence of such an agreement, the public employer could not force an employee to use vested compensatory time. The Harris County, Texas
Sheriff's Department had not obtained any prior agreement regarding the
forced-use of compensatory time from its employees. Accordingly, the
Department of Labor found that the department's forced-use policy violated the FLSA4
Notwithstanding the opinion letter, the sheriff's office proceeded to order employees approaching the maximum limits on vested compensatory
time to use the paid leave time or face mandatory use of the time at their
supervisor's discretion. Employees, who were potentially affected by the
new policy, brought suit seeking to block the implementation of the department's policy of forced-use of compensatory time.42
Although the district court found the employees' claim to have merit,43
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial Circuit reversed. 4 The
Fifth Circuit held the Department of Labor's opinion letter did not constitute a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision.

38. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2000) (mandating employers provide enhanced compensation for overtime hours worked).
39. See Christensen,529 U.S. at 580-81.
40. See id.

41. See id.
42. See id.at 581.
43. See Moreau v. Harris County, 945 F. Supp. 1067 (S.D. Tex. 1996), rev'd, 158 F.3d
241 (5th Cir. 1998).
44. See Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241,247 (5th Cir. 1998), aff'd, Christensen
v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
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On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas explained:
In Chevron, we held that a court must give effect to an agency's regulation containing
a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute....
Here, however, we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter, not
one arived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or a notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of
which lack the force of law---do not warrant Chevron-style deference.... Instead,
interpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are "entitled to respect"
under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co... 45

The majority found "unpersuasive the agency's interpretation of the
statute at issue in this case." 6 Justice Thomas did not provide any additional explanation for the majority's refusal to afford the Department of
Labor's opinion letter Chevron deference.
Because of the extreme brevity of Justice Thomas's explanation, Christensen did not really make clear precisely why an agency opinion letter
does not merit Chevron deference. 47 On the one hand, the majority suggests that an agency interpretation that lacks the process associated with a
formal adjudication or a notice-and-comment rulemaking is not entitled to
Chevron deference because such interpretations "lack the force of law."A8
Viewed in this light, Chevron deference flows from a delegation of lawmaking power from Congress, rather than as a matter of deference to superior agency expertise. 49
On the other hand, however, the majority also suggests that process values support the result. Because an opinion letter does not necessarily constitute an agency's considered judgment-after all, such materials may or
may not reflect the careful application of agency expertise-a reviewing
court should not be required to give such agency interpretations Chevron
deference. 0
45. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586-87 (citations omitted),

46. Id. at 587.
47. See Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WK. & MARY L. REv. 1105, 1121-24 (2001) (noting "[allthough
the Court does not fully explain its rationale," one can posit several reasons that support the
result, including the lack of an implied congressional delegation, the absence of process, and
separation of powers concerns).
48. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
49. See Anthony, supranote 9, at 43-44.
50. See Rossi, supra note 47, at 1123 (noting that process values might relate to Chevron deference and suggesting that "[wihere the agency's interpretation is adopted without

such public participation and with no guarantee of an explanatory record, heightened judi-
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A process-rationale for withholding Chevron deference has a great deal
of persuasive force: if an agency can obtain the benefit of Chevron deference without incurring the cost of using rulemaking or adjudication to arrive at the interpretation, a rational bureaucrat might often dispense with
the process.51 If Chevron rests on the assumption that an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute reflects and incorporates the agency's superior expertise, an agency should not be permitted to claim the benefit of
Chevron deference in circumstances where the reviewing court is uncertain
that the decision at bar actually is the product of agency expertise.
Although Vermont Yankee prohibits a reviewing court from demanding
more process than Congress requires in the organic statute authorizing the
agency to act,52 it would not be inconsistent with Vermont Yankee to make
a reviewing court's deference to agency work product turn on the quality of
process associated with the agency's decision. Absent a congressional
command to use rulemaking or adjudication to resolve statutory ambiguities, under the implied delegation doctrine theory, an administrative agency
would be free to cast bones to pick from among possible reasonable interpretations of an ambiguous statute. After casting the bones, the agency
would simply publish an interpretative rule or guideline announcing the result.
Consistent with Vermont Yankee, a reviewing court could not require the
agency to use additional process to inform its decision. That said, in applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review mandated by section 706(2)(a) of the APA,a reviewing court would be perfectly entitled to
weigh the arbitrary selection mechanism in determining whether the agency
decision is rational. In this sense, an expertise-based rationale for judicial
deference would work in tandem with section 706 of the APA. Chevron's
requirement of reflexive judicial deference, regardless of the quality of the
process associated with the agency's work product, does not well comport
with section 706's requirement that a reviewing court make an independent
determination that the agency's decision reflects something more than
whim or caprice.53
Although Christensen relied upon both the implied delegation and process value rationales, in Mead54 the Supreme Court squarely located the requirement of Chevron deference on a theory of an implied. delegation of
cial scrutiny of the agency's statutory interpretations enhances the legitimacy of the
agency's action.").

51. See William Funk, When Is a "Rule" a Regulation? Marking A ClearLine Between NonlegislativeRules andLegislative Rules, 54 ADmn. L. Rsv. 659 (2002).
52. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 542-44, 546-49.
53. See generally Rossi, supra note 47, at 1144-46 (suggesting that the quality of the
agency's process and reasoning should factor into the application of Skidmore deference).
54. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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lawmaking power. Under Mead, federal courts should afford Chevron deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory texts only when the
agency enjoys 55congressionally-delegated power to make quasi-statutory
interpretations.
Mead involved the U.S. Customs Service's decision to characterize certain Mead Corporation day planners as "diaries" rather than as "other
items" of a similar sort.56 If characterized as "other items," no tariff would
be due upon importation of the articles into the United States. On the other
hand, if the Customs Service deemed the day planners "diaries," a four percent tariff would apply to each day planner that Mead Corporation sought
to import into the United States."7 The Customs Service makes its designations of particular items on an ad hoc basis, using interpretive rules that
are neither the product of notice-and-comment rulemaking nor codified in
5
the Code of FederalRegulations."
Thus, Meadpresented the Justices with an opportunity to clarify the precise rationale of the result in Christensen. In an eight to one decision, the
Court held that interpretative rules or guidelines are not entitled to Chevron
deference unless the organic statute authorizing the agency to act vests the
agency with the power to enact quasi-statutory rules implementing the law.
According to Justice Souter, only when Congress delegates lawmaking
power can an agency claim the benefit of Chevron deference: "We have
recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment

in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which def-

erence is claimed." 59
Nevertheless, Justice Souter strangely equates relatively formal agency
process as an effective proxy or marker for an implied delegation of law-

making power:
It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with
the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement
of such force.... That said, and as significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing
to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we
even when no such administrahave sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference
6
tive formality was required and none was afforded. 0

55. See id. at 227-30.
56. See id. at 220-26.

57. See id. at 225.
58. See id. at 220-24 (describing the agency's process of establishing its classification
rules for imported goods).
59. Id. at 229.
60. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31 (citations omitted).
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Of course, there is no reason to believe that the amount of process associated with an agency's decision necessarily bears any relationship to congressionalintent regarding the agency's ability to issue binding interpretations of the statutes under its jurisdiction. There is, of course, good cause
to equate process with the exercise of expertise, yet the benefit of agency
expertise, per se, has nothing to do with whether Chevron deference applies
to a particular agency statutory interpretation.
The Mead majority concluded that the Customs Service's classification
rulings did not qualify for Chevron deference because such materials "present a case far removed not only from notice-and-comment process, but
from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress ever
thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for
them here.," 61 Although a congressional delegation of lawmaking authority
may be either express or implied, a reviewing court must find that such a
delegation has occurred before affording agency work product Chevron
deference.
Even if implied delegations can trigger Chevron deference, it seems very
odd for the Mead majority to invoke the lack of formality and uniformity in
the creation and enforcement of customs classifications as evidence that
they should not have the force of law.6 2 "It is difficult, in fact, to see in the
agency practice itself any indication that Customs ever set out with a lawmaking pretense in mind when it undertook to make classifications like
these., 63 If the relevant question really relates to congressional intent, the
quality of the process associated with establishing the classification rulings
should not be outcome determinative. In fact, Congress itself often exercises its own lawmaking powers with little or no process, enacting bills that
no member of either house has even seen, much less bothered to read. Although Congress may hold agencies to a higher standard of procedural
regularity than it observes itself, there is really no reason to use process as
an effective proxy for congressional intent.
Remarkably, the fact that Congress requires the Customs Service to use
notice-and-comment procedures to revoke or modify an existing classification also failed to demonstrate the requisite delegation of lawmaking
authority. "The statutory changes [requiring the use of rulemaking] reveal
no new congressional objective of treating classification decisions generally as rulemaking with the force of law, nor do they suggest any intent to
61.

Id. at231.

62. See id. at 231-34 (citing the ad hoc nature of the agency's classification rules as
supporting conclusion that Congress did not delegate power to enact regulations with the
force of law, even though to modify an existing classification ruling Congress required the
Customs Service to use rulemaking procedures).
63. Id. at 233.
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create a Chevron patchwork of classification rulings, some with force of
law, some without.""
Although Chevron deference did not apply, the majority held that the
lower court erred by failing to apply Skidmore deference to the classification ruling. 'There is room at least to raise a Skidmore claim here, where
the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and Customs can bring the benefit
of specialized experience to bear on the subtle questions in this case:
whether the daily planner with room for brief daily entries falls under 'diaries' ....
,65 Thus, Justice Souter orients Skidmore deference as a function
of agency expertise, whereas, at least as a formal matter, Chevron deference revolves around the fiction of a congressional delegation to create
statutory glosses with the force of law. The majority remanded the case to
permit the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to apply Skidmore
to the Customs Service's ruling regarding Mead's day planners. 66
Justice Scalia authored an angry dissent. 67 As he had suggested earlier
in Christensen,68 he argued that all "authoritative" agency interpretations
should receive Chevron deference. 69 In Justice Scalia's view, the majority
approach simply allows reviewing courts to displace agency interpretations
of ambiguous statutes with their own interpretations by refusing to find an
express or implied delegation of lawmaking power. 70
Mead arguably completes the turn that Chevron itself began: the degree
of deference that an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute will receive is contingent on a reviewing court finding a congressional delegation
of lawmaking power to the agency. Judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous laws is not a function of greater agency expertise, but
rather flows from the reviewing court's recognition that Congress vested a
particular interpretive task with the administrative agency rather than the
federal courts.

64. Id. at 234.
65. Id. at 235.

66. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (vacating judgment and remanding with direction to apply Skidmore).
67. See generally id.
at 239-61 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

68. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589-91 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (rejecting Skidmore deference as "an anachronism, dating from an era in which we declined to give agency interpretations (including interpretive regulations, as opposed to 'legislative rules') authoritative effect" and observing

that "we have accorded Chevron deference not only to agency regulations, but to authoritative agency positions set forth in a variety of other formats." (citations omitted)).
69. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 239, 256-58 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing where an ad-

ministrative agency's authoritative interpretation is reasonable, courts should give deference).
70. See generally id.at 239-45.
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II. A MODEST PROPOSAL: SKIDMORE DEFERENCE AND THE QUEST FOR
RATIONAL AGENCY BEHAVIOR
Both Chevron and Mead fail to accord adequate weight to the expertise
rationale for affording deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous
texts. To be sure, if Congress signals a desire for courts, rather than agencies, to have the last word in construing the meaning of a particular statute,
then the federal courts should undertake principal responsibility for filling
in statutory gaps. In the absence of an express indication that the agency
charged with enforcing a particular statute would have primary responsibility for its interpretation or enforcement, the delegation question should
not be particularly difficult: Congress intends for agencies, and not the
courts, to interpret and apply the laws over which it has given a particular
agency jurisdiction.7 1
The Mead Court's search for a legal fiction--an implicit delegation of
lawmaking power-simply makes no sense. Surely Congress anticipated
that the Customs Service, and not the federal judiciary, would have primary
responsibility for deciding whether a Mead day planner constitutes a "diary" for purposes of applying the nation's tariff laws. Congress almost
never directly vests an agency with an express lawmaking power over all
aspects of its operation. Some statutes directly authorize agencies to write
rules and issue orders incident to enforcement of a particular chapter or title, but a sufficiently ingenious court could always find some way of distinguishing the specific agency action at issue from the sorts of actions that
come within the scope of the express congressional delegation.
71. Ironically, the decision to apply Chevron deference has in past cases appeared to be
a function of how much the reviewing court liked the agency's gloss. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in particular, has routinely failed to receive Chevron deference for its interpretations of civil rights laws, even though the agency arguably
has relevant experience and expertise in dealing with job discrimination that the federal
courts do not possess. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 478-84 (1999)
(disregarding the EEOC's interpretation of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) in
favor of its own construction of the statute); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
257-58 (1991) (disregarding the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, which favored extraterritorial effect, in favor of its own construction, which limited the law to domestic effect); see
also S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disability
Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REv. 603, 661-66 (2001) (noting the judiciary's
failure to accord EEOC interpretations of the ADA much deference and suggesting that the
judiciary's alternative interpretations have failed to incorporate important differences between the ADA and Title VII), Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and DisabilityDiscrimination, 99 MicH. L. REV. 532 (2000) (noting the Supreme Court's failure to give deference
to the EEOC's interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions); cf Washington v. Davis,
426 U S. 229, 263-64 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing EEOC regulations are "entitled to great deference" and applying administrative law precedents mandating deference to
an EEOC regulation).
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The implied delegation prong of the Mead test represents a naked power
grab by the federal courts. A reviewing court that wishes to sustain an
agency interpretation will find an implied delegation, whereas a court that
wishes to displace an agency's interpretation will find that such an implied
delegation of lawmaking power does not exist. Because the inference will
arise not from any direct language in the statute, but rather from the overall
structure and operation of the law, a reviewing court will face few practical
constraints in granting or withholding Chevron deference.
Moreover, even if an agency interprets ambiguous statutory language incident to a notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, in the
absence of an express or implied delegation of "lawmaking authority," the
amount of process associated with the decision is, at least as a formal matter, wholly irrelevant to the degree of deference that a reviewing court owes
to the agency's work product.72 Considered from the perspective of preChevron cases, this makes no sense.
Perhaps more importantly, it also makes no sense from the perspective
of fitting Skidmore and Chevron into the structural framework of the APA.
Surely the federal judiciary has some obligation to apply the framework for
review that Congress established-in this case, section 706(2) of the
APA73-when reviewing the legality of agency action. Of course, in Chevron itself Justice Stevens never bothered to explain how or why the Chevron rule comports with section 706. As Justice Scalia has observed,
"[tihere is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the
Procedure Act (APA), which it did not even bother to
Administrative
74
cite."
72. Again, one should note that Justice Souter seems to conflate an agency using formal process with a congressional intention to delegate lawmaking power to the agency. See
Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-33 (suggesting that informal procedures associated with creation of
classification rulings belies agency's claim that Congress intended them to have force of
law). If the application of agency expertise triggered Chevron, such an approach would
make sense. However, if the true test is congressional intent, a careful search of floor
statements and committee reports seems a more useful source of relevant information than
the agency's behavior in enforcing a particular statutory provision. Justice Souter's approach turns the search for congressional intent into a consideration of the formality of process that the agency provided when establishing the rule. One wonders, however, if the
EEOC's use of formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking to establish a policy

would insulate it from judicial invalidation. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
Justice Scalia's objection that the Mead test is too easily subject to judicial manipulation
therefore has a good deal of merit See Mead, 533 U.S. at 241-50 (Scalia, J.,dissenting)

(objecting that the majority's approach relies on irrelevant factors to fird congressional intent and suggesting that the test is capable of infinite judicial manipulation).
73. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000) (setting forth scope of review standards that govern
when a court reviews an agency's action).
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
74. Mead, 533 U.S. 243 (Scalia, J.,
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One could infer that an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute is
presumptively rational if it does not conflict with a plainly expressed congressional objective and seems to be an otherwise reasonable interpretation
of the text. Yet, if it is the reasonable nature of the interpretation that
drives the result, Chevron deference should not turn on whether a reviewing court can find an implied delegation of lawmaking authority. Instead,
Chevron deference should turn on the apparent reliability of the agency's
decision.
When an agency engages in notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication, and the decision enjoys substantial support in the record, a reviewing court should not lightly displace the agency's decision-including
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory text. This result flows in
part from the fact that Congress delegated the decision to the agency. More
importantly, however, the agency has brought to bear its institutional expertise in sifting through the materials laid upon the record. Given the
agency's superior knowledge of the area, and Congress's delegation of responsibility for regulating to the agency, a reviewing court should defer to
the agency's resolution of a debatable question of statutory interpretation.
This result is certainly consistent with Congress's delegation of responsibility to the agency. But, under the APA, the reviewing court retains an
independent obligation to ensure that an agency has acted rationally. 75 Although a reviewing court cannot demand that an agency utilize particular
procedures to ensure that the agency's end product is not arbitrary or capricious, a reviewing court logically could indulge in a strong presumption
that an agency interpretation that results from a notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication is not irrational (again, assuming that the record supports the agency's factual assumptions).
If an agency, consistent with Vermont Yankee, elects not to engage in
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, a reviewing court
could reasonably demand some indication that the agency has actually
brought its expertise to bear on the matter in question. In other words,
when the process values associated with an agency decision do not themselves ensure the rationality of the decision, section 706(2) of the APA requires courts to engage in more demanding review. In such circumstances,
agency work product should have the power to persuade, but not compel.
Viewed in this light, Skidmore deference applies when an agency elects

to forego a process that usually ensures the considered application of
75. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (stating that reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set
aside any agency action that is "arbitrary and capricious"); see also Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-16 (1971) (discussing the obligation of a
reviewing court to apply carefully the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review and to
disallow agency action that fails to meet this test).
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agency expertise. The agency remains free to make the choice: invest substantial time and effort in process, in exchange for deferential judicial review or avoid procedural bells and whistles, but face a less reflexively deferential reviewing court. This choice flows not from some legal fiction of
implied delegation, but directly from the APA's mandate to reviewing
courts to ensure that agency work product is demonstrably rational.
Under the theory of Mead, an agency decision that reflects the benefit of
open participation among affected entities and careful application of
agency expertise would receive only limited deference in the absence of
either an express or implied delegation of lawmaking power. At the same
time, a poorly conceived agency decision, made with limited or nonexistent public participation, might enjoy Chevron deference if the reviewing court finds an express or implied delegation of lawmaking authority. This turns judicial review of agency efforts at statutory interpretation
into a bad farce.
The Supreme Court should correct this mistake at the soonest available
opportunity. Christensen correctly noted the relationship between process
and deference; an agency that desires judicial deference must be prepared
to provide sufficient process to assure a reviewing court that the agency decision reflects the benefit of considered agency expertise. Conversely, an
agency that wishes to forego process in favor of speed remains free to do
so, but must be willing to justify its decision on judicial review to a degree
that would not be the case if the agency had provided additional process.
Such an approach would not transgress the rule of Vermont Yankee, because an administrative agency would always be free to choose whether or
not to engage in process in order to obtain judicial deference. Vermont
Yankee simply precludes a reviewing court from forcing an agency to adopt
particular procedural devices regardless of its willingness or ability to defend its decision on the merits based on the record before the court.
Finally, this approach would relate, in a meaningful way, the Supreme
Court's doctrines of deference with section 706 of the APA. An agency
decision that is demonstrably the product of expertise will enjoy a high presumption of rationality; as the agency abandons process values, the presumption of rationality will correspondingly decline. Chevron simply represents a case in which the presumption of rationality should be at its
zenith, precisely because the EPA had demonstrably brought its expertise
to bear in the context of a process that afforded widespread participation
rights to myriad interested parties (i.e., notice-and-comment rulemaking).
Where an agency's decision has already been tested in a reliable fashion,
and a reviewing court has the benefit of a full record against which to judge
the agency's action, an agency's decision should be presumptively valid.
As one moves away from this paradigm, judicial scrutiny must increase in
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order to ensure that the agency's work product is, in fact, not arbitrary or
capricious.
All of this would suggest that Skidmore actually states the more general
rule of law: an agency's decision should receive a level of judicial deference that is more or less proportionate to the degree of confidence that the
reviewing court has in the procedure associated with the agency reaching
its decision. When an agency relies upon a procedure that is virtually certain to result in a sound decision (e.g., formal rulemaking or adjudication),
a court should invalidate the agency action only when it is demonstrably
inconsistent with the expressly declared intent of Congress. When an
agency does not utilize procedures likely to ensure a rational decision, a reviewing court must take a closer look at the agency's decision and the reasons that support it.
CONCLUSION

In my view, Chevron departed from the primary justification for affording agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes deference: administrative
agencies possess greater expertise than the generalist courts that review
their decisions. 76 If expertise, rather than some sort of fictional delegation
of lawmaking power, undergirds judicial deference to administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutory texts, judicial review will have to rely
upon a sliding scale of deference, depending on the indicia of expertise associated with a particular agency decision. If the goal of judicial review is
to ensure rational agency action, such an approach is not a mere convenience, but rather a necessity. Given the mandate of section 706 of the APA,
it is difficult to understand why an agency decision should be afforded a
strong presumption of validity when the agency has an express delegation
of lawmaking power, but the process associated with the agency's use of
that power leaves a reasonable person doubtful about the reliability of the
decision.
Administrative regulations can prove bankrupting to affected industries.
In United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp.,77 the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) adopted uniform standards for the processing of
76. See generally Patricia NMWald, The "New Administrative Law"--With the Same
Old Judges In It?, 1991 DUKE L.J. 647, 657-59 (questioning plausibility of dialogic model
of judicial review of agency action because judges lack familiarity with esoteric information
crucial to agency decision making and noting that "asking judges to familiarize themselves
enough with the policies and operations of the dozens of agencies that appear in hundreds of

cases a year, and whose functions vary from labor to shipping to nuclear energy to gas
regulation, so that we can participate as equals in their good governance, is asking a great

deal.").
77. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
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canned fish products, rather than standards specific to each kind of fish.
Whitefish producers claimed that the preparation requirements would make
it impossible to process whitefish in a way that would result in a commercially viable product; essentially, compliance with the FDA's regulations
would have bankrupted the industry.78 The FDA undoubtedly possessed an
express delegation of power to write statutory rules regarding food prepa-

ration, so as to avoid the sale of adulterated foods. Under the logic of
Mead, a reviewing court would owe the FDA's regulations on commercial
fish preparation Chevron deference.
To the extent that Mead and Christensen ratify Chevron's departure,
rather than correct it, the U.S. Supreme Court has drifted even further away
from the roots of deference-agency expertise and experience. 79 Congressional intent does, of course, provide an important rationale for permitting
agencies, rather than the courts, to parse ambiguous statutory texts. For

purposes of applying the doctrine of separation of powers, congressional
intent, whether expressed or implied, justifies a general posture of judicial
deference.80
When deciding whether a particular agency effort is "arbitrary and capricious" for purposes of applying section 706 of the APA, however, federal courts must look to the indicia of reliability associated with the agency
action and not to the legitimacy of the agency's claim to primacy in interpreting the ambiguous statutory text. The fact that Congress preferred that

78. See id. at 248-53 (finding that FDA failed to consider material issues associated
with incidence of botulism in whitefish, failed to properly discuss and disclose pertinent scientific data, and as a result, adopted generic health regulations for processed fish products
that would likely destroy whitefish as a commercial product).
79. The Mead rule also does little to explain why agency interpretations of ambiguous
regulations should receive Chevron deference. Even if an agency enjoys the authority to
parse ambiguous statutes within its jurisdiction, this does not explain or justify a similar rule
of deference when the implementing regulations are themselves ambiguous. But see Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457-63 (1997) (holding that agency's interpretations of ambiguous
regulations should receive judicial deference), Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S.
504, 512 (1994) (giving broad deference to agency interpretations of its own regulations and
suggesting such action is especially appropriate when complex technical regulations are at
issue); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36,44-47 (1993) (requiring that lower courts give
agency's interpretation of arguably ambiguous regulations deference). An expertise-based
justification for Chevron deference avoids this difficulty: an agency's application of expertise to ambiguous text merits deference because the agency possesses more competence than
does a reviewing court and the agency also has demonstrated that its decision reflects the
benefit of its special competence.
80. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803) (explaining that
"[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.

Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that
rule.").
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the agency, rather than the reviewing court, fill in the blanks says nothing
of value regarding the reliability or rationality of the particular agency action at bar. To the extent that the agency can demonstrate that the action at
issue reflects and incorporates the benefit of agency expertise, a reviewing
court should afford deference; to the extent that it cannot make such a
demonstration, deference is not justified in light of the APA's mandate.

